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Intensity and State Estimation in Quantum Cryptography 
Sindhu Chitikela  
Abstract. This paper describes how the communicating parties can employ intensity and state 
estimation to detect if the eavesdropper has siphoned off and injected photons in the received 
communication. This is of relevance in quantum cryptography based on random rotations of 
photon polarizations.  
Introduction 
The paper investigates the use of state and intensity measurements by Alice and Bob to detect the 
presence of the active eavesdropper and the use of mixed states rather than pure states in the 
transmission process. This use can be applied to variations of the three-stage quantum 
cryptography protocols based on random unitary transformations [1]-[6]. 
 
Apart from the faked-state attack [7], [8], the main weakness of BB84 protocol is that single 
photons are not easy to produce, and the duplicate photons can be used by the eavesdropper to 
reconstruct the key. The attacker can siphon off the photons when they are transferred between 
Alice and Bob. Moreover, as the photons are siphoned off only at one step, the intensity of the 
output at the receiver’s end is not affected. There is also the problem of generating single 
photons [9] as well as lack of availability of single photon detectors.  
 
The polarization rotation protocols are based on fundamental cryptographic primitives [10]. The 
protocol called iAQC [5] is a variant of three-stage in which Alice and Bob track the intensity of 
the laser beam at each stage making it possible to detect the intruder. But the drawback of iAQC 
lies in the scenario when Eve removes some photons and replaces them with the same number of 
photons with different polarization back into the stream where the intensity remains constant. 
Such siphoning can be done by fiber tapping [11] or using half silvered mirrors if the 
communication media is free space. In this case the intensity is not changed and hence Eve will 
not be discovered and the changes in the state will be ascribed to noise. In order to overcome this 
threat from Eve, an additional step of detecting the state of photons using tomography [12] is 
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considered in this paper. This new protocol is called ISA (intensity and state aware) quantum 
cryptography. A certain fraction of the received photons are examined for their intensity and 
state to determine if Eve has siphoned off  photons and replaced them with other photons that 
can be found by determining the state.  
 
The ISA system can be used for the standard three-stage protocol or its many variations [13]-[16] 
including the one-stage protocol [2]. In this paper, the process of state determination will be 
illustrated by examining only one transmission. 
 
Intensity and State Aware Protocol (ISA) 
In the ISA protocol proposed here, Alice keeps track of the state of the photons in addition to the 
intensity of the photons. In general, we will consider mixed states for which the density operator 
is a convenient representation. Assuming that a quantum system is in one of the number of states 
iψ , where i is an index with probabilities ip , { ip | iψ } is an ensemble of pure states. The 
density operator of the system is defined as ∑=
i
iiip ψψρ . The main criterion to decide if a 
state is pure or mixed is considering the trace (tr) of the density matrix. If the tr is less than one 
then the state is said to be a mixed state else it is pure state. 
 
Alice initially sends a bunch of photons which are in pure state and are randomly polarized to 
Bob. At this step, Alice computes the density matrix 𝜌 of the pure state photons. Bob rotates 
these photons through an angle of 𝜙 which can be either 0o or 90o and sends them back to Alice. 
As in our ping-pong protocol, if Bob chooses 𝜙  as 0o, it means that he has chosen bit 0. If he 
chooses 𝜙  as 90o, it means that he has chosen bit 1.  Alice now computes the density matrices 𝜌′ 
and 𝜌′′ of these photons assuming that they are rotated by 0o and 90o by Bob respectively.  
Suppose that Eve siphons off x number of photons in the first stage and puts x number of photons 
with different polarization back into the stream. Therefore, a total of 2x photons are siphoned off 
throughout the transmission. Eve will not be caught by the techniques that detect intruders unless 
the value of 2x reaches 50% of the total number of photons sent by Alice. So, Alice has to use 
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this technique of computation and comparison of density matrices to catch the eavesdropper. The 
following section illustrates the processing done at Alice and the way Eve is caught.   
Figure 1 shows the ISA protocol. The process of Alice and Eve detecting the state of the photons 
uses quantum tomography as explained in detail in the following section. 
 
Figure 1 Intensity and State Aware Quantum Cryptography  
 
Tomography 
Both Alice and Eve have to measure the unknown states to the information that Bob has sent. 
This is achieved by quantum state tomography by which identical unknown quantum states is 
characterized. Initially, all the photons pairs are filtered using the spatial filters and frequency 
filters. After the filtering process, the unknown states are measured by the process of projection 
[12]. An arbitrary polarization measurement can be realized using a quarter-wave plate, a half-
waveplate and a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) in an order.  The quarter-wave plate and the half-
waveplate are used to rotate the state to H  .  
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Then the PBS will transmit the projected state and reflect its orthogonal compliment. The 
resultant measurement state is sent through the detectors and a photon counting circuit is 
implemented to maintain the coincidental counts. Using the likelihood function, the T matrix is 
obtained and using the T matrix density operator can be calculated as 𝜌= T-1T / Tr{ T-1T} [12]. 
Once the density operator or matrix 𝜌 is obtained, any single-qubit density matrix, 𝜌 can be 
uniquely represented by three parameters {S1, S2, S3} are the Stokes parameters such that 𝜌 = 
∑ (𝑆𝑖𝜎𝑖)3𝑖=1   such that 𝜎0  = �1 00 1� , 𝜎1  = �0 11 0� , 𝜎2  = �0 −𝑖𝑖 0 �  and 𝜎3  = �1 00 −1�.  
Measurements can also be made in any non-orthogonal bases. The following computation 
illustrates how Stokes parameters which correspond the measurement in the D/A (diagonal), H/V 
(rectilinear) and R/L (right-circular and left-circular) basis are calculated and their representation 
on the Poincare′ sphere is shown. Note that in our case, the Stokes parameter (S2) corresponding 
to the R/L basis is always zero. Suppose Alice receives a bunch of photons from Bob and obtains 
the density matrix as 𝜌 =�0.5 0.50.5 0.5� . By the equation }{ ρσ ii TrS ≡ , the Stokes parameters can 
be calculated as S0=1, S1=1, S2=0, S3=0. Since 1
3
0
=∑ =i iS , it indicates that the obtained state is 
pure state. Figure 3 shows the representation of these values in the Poincaré sphere. Since the 
state is on the surface, it is a pure state. 
It is assumed that Alice picks up a random polarization angle, 𝜃 and sends pure state photons to 
Bob. In addition, Alice computes two density matrices, imagining that Alice makes a rotation of 
0o in one case and 90o in the other case. Assuming that Bob makes a 0o rotation on the photons 
that he receives, Alice computes the density matrix, 𝜌. Assuming that Bob makes a 90o rotation, 
Alice computes the density matrix as 𝜌′.  
Once Alice receives the photons from Bob in the second stage, she computes a new density 
matrix for that photon state as 𝜌′′ and then compares it with 𝜌 and 𝜌′. If there is no match, then 
Alice assumes that the states that she received is not pure and she makes sure by verifying if the 
trace of  ( 𝜌′′ )2 is less than one which means that it is mixed state.  This is how Eve is detected in 
this model. Let the polarization of photons added by Eve be φ.  
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Figure 2 Quantum Tomography 
The following calculations show how Eve’s interference is discovered. It is assumed that Alice 
sends a total of 100 photons with the polarization angle 𝜃 =30o. Suppose that Eve siphons off 5 
photons and injects 5 other photons with a random polarization, φ of about 45o in the first stage. 
Then Bob rotates the photons by 𝜃 =00. Then in the second stage Eve takes 5 more photons and 
injects 5 photons with the same polarization, φ. That means 80 photons are with the state
121023 +  and 20 with state 12102/1 + . Now the density matrices 𝜌 , 𝜌′and 𝜌′′ 
computed by Alice are 
                  𝜌= �
3 /4 √3 /4
√3 /4 1/4 �; 𝜌′ =� 3/4 √3 /4√3 /4 1/4 �; 𝜌′′ =� 0.7 0.44640.4464 0.3 � 
which is quite different from that of 𝜌 and 𝜌′  and the trace of (𝜌′′) 2  is less than 1. Therefore, 
Eve is caught. If Alice finds that the photons are in pure state, she uses quantum tomography to 
find the unknown state. Any physical density matrix can be diagonalized and its corresponding 
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eigenvalues and eigenvectors can be computed. The eigenvalues of 𝜌 are {0.0000, 1.0000} and 
the corresponding eigenvectors are (-0.5000, 0.8660) and (0.8660, 0.5000) respectively. The 
eigenvalues of   𝜌′′   are {0.0108, 0.9892} and corresponding eigenvectors calculated are (-
0.5437, 0.8393) and (0.8393, 0.5437) respectively. The eigenvalues of any density matrix give 
the intensities and their corresponding eigenvector gives the angle at each intensity. 
 
Figure 3 Poincaré sphere 
The following graphs show the change in intensities as the number of photons siphoned off by 
Eve changes. The angle by which Alice rotates the photons is denoted by 𝜃 and the polarization 
of photons inserted by Eve as φ. The graph in Figure 4 indicates the intensities of photons at the 
highest peak obtained when 𝜃 = 22.50 and φ =300.  
 
Figure 4 Graph showing the varying peak intensities with change  
in number of photons manipulated by Eve when  𝜃 = 22.50 and φ =300 
 
Figure 5 to Figure 11 indicate the angle at which the intensity is high and the peak intensities 
varying with the number of photons manipulated by Eve. The examples are considered with 
difference between angle used by Alice and Eve that is (𝜃-φ) as 7.50, 150, 300 and 600. The 
intensities and the values of angle are obtained by the computation of eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors. 
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Figure 5 Graph showing the varying values of angle whose intensities are high  
with change in number of photons manipulated by Eve when 𝜃 = 22.50 and φ =300  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Graph showing the varying peak intensities with change in  
number of photons manipulated by Eve when  𝜃 = 450 and φ =600 
         
Figure 7. Graph showing the varying values of angle whose intensities are high  
with change in number of photons manipulated by Eve when 𝜃 = 450 and φ =600 
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Figure 8. Graph showing the varying peak intensities with change in number  
of photons manipulated by Eve when  𝜃 = 300 and φ =600 
 
Figure 9. Graph showing the varying values of angle whose intensities are high 
with change in number of photons manipulated by Eve when 𝜃 = 300 and φ =600 
 
Figure 10. Graph showing the varying peak intensities with change in number  
of photons manipulated by Eve when  𝜃 = 300 and φ =900 
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Figure 11 Graph showing the varying values of angle whose intensities are high  
with change in number of photons manipulated by Eve when 𝜃 = 300 and φ =900 
 
Combining the results from all the above experiments, the graphs in Figure 12 and Figure 13 are 
obtained. The Figure 12 shows the varying peak intensities as the difference between 𝜃 and φ 
varies. Similarly Figure 13 shows the varying angle at the peak intensities as the difference 
between 𝜃 and φ varies. 
 
Figure 12 Graph showing the varying values peak intensities with the difference  
between 𝜃 and φ equals 7.50, 150, 300 and 600 
    
 Figure 13 Graph showing the varying values of angles at peak intensities with  
the difference between 𝜃 and φ equals 7.50, 150, 300 and 600 
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Conclusion 
The ISA protocol overcomes one of the drawbacks of iAQC and helps to detect the intruder by 
tracking the state of the photons. This paper has shown the influence on the main received state 
and angle between the polarizations chosen by Alice and those by Eve so as to determine 
whether Eve is present. But this has only been done in a general way. Further research needs to 
obtain statistical results on the confidence in the decision reached and how it is related to the 
number of photons that are used in the cryptographic protocol. 
 
Further research is also needed to investigate the use of other means of coding binary 
information in quantum state in the communication between the two parties.  This can include 
use of mixed quantum states. Mathematical analysis will be performed to relate the confidence in 
detecting the eavesdropper based on analyzed fraction of data and also the probability of false 
alarm. The eavesdropper’s actions will be examined from a game-theoretic perspective. The 
performance of the various variants of the three-stage protocol will be investigated for various 
noise environments. 
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